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POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARINGS-PLAIN ERROR
Louisiana has never legislatively adopted the plain error doc-
trine' of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
contemporaneous objection rule' has historically barred complaints
about most trial errors unless objected to at the time of occurrence.
With few exceptions, the legislative scheme places the burden on
the defendant to "speak now or forever hold your peace."3
In a sense the rule is a dictate of fairness to the state and the
trial judge insofar as it requires defense counsel to alert the court
and thereby to afford an opportunity to avoid the error. The rule
also embodies the notion that complaints not timely asserted con-
stitute a waiver of the right to assert the complaint.'
In State v. Cox,' the supreme court declined to apply the con-
temporaneous objection rule to bar a complaint regarding the length
of a sentence. The court reasoned that article 841 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure was by its own terms limited to pre-
verdict errors. Since the imposition of sentence occurs after the ver-
dict, the court did not perceive that defendant's failure to object at
the time of sentence barred assigning the error for appeal.
In State v. Sonnier, the court had occasion to apply a plain er-
ror approach in reversing a death sentence and in remanding for a
new penalty trial. The jury in Sonnier was erroneously instructed
concerning the availability of work release for persons convicted of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they are not brought to the attention of the court."
2. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
3. Professor Dale Bennett, one of the reporters for the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, described the purpose of the article in the comments as disallowing an "anchor
to windward."
4. The present language of LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841 does not contain the
"waiver" language of article 841 as it was originally enacted. The 1974 amendment
deleted the formerly required reservation of a bill of exceptions and conformed the
language of article 841 to the companion provision of the Code of Civil Procedure and
to Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See comment (c), LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 841 as amended by 1974 La. Act, No. 207.
5. 369 So. 2d 118 (La. 1979).
6. 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1980).
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first degree murder.7 Although defense counsel was consulted prior
to the instruction and made no complaint, the supreme court
remanded the matter for a new sentence hearing because the in-
struction was erroneous.
The implications of Sonnier are both fair and far-reaching. They
are fair in the sense that the limitation imposed by article 841 is
statutorily related to pre-verdict complaints. The last amendment to
article 841 was enacted prior to the advent of capital sentencing
hearings.8 The draftsmen of original article 841 and article 841 as
amended9 probably did not foresee the prompt arrival of either ap-
pellate review of sentence" or of bifurcated capital trials." There is
no reason to believe that the legislature intended article 841 to bar
complaints about post-verdict procedures which had not yet been
created.
The plain error approach is also fair for the reasons so well
stated in Sonnier by Justice Calogero on rehearing: "[T]his Court is
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the jury's recommenda-
tion to determine whether the sentence was influenced by passion,
prejudice or any arbitrary factor. The Court must consequently con-
duct an independent review, regardless of the failure of defense
counsel to object to possible error, to determine whether any of
these factors contributed to the jury's recommendation .... ."" Thus,
it is clearly envisioned by the Louisiana statutory scheme (which
embodies the constitutional requirements) that the supreme court is
to perform an independent review of the record to determine the ap-
propriateness of the death penalty. 3 Plainly prejudicial error,
whether objected to or not, should be noticed, because the matter is
literally one of life or death for the accused.
The Sonnier decision is far-reaching in that it introduces in Loui-
siana, at least in the area of capital sentencing, the familiar plain er-
7. The instructions implied that the defendant would be eligible to participate in
certain work release programs when, in fact, under Department of Corrections regula-
tions, he would not have been eligible.
8. See 1974 La. Acts, No. 207.
9. The writer was reporter for the Louisiana Law Institute Advisory Committee
which proposed 1974 La. Acts, No. 207. While the writer prefers to consider himself en-
dowed with prescience and perspicacity, he did not, nor did any member of the Law
Institute, nor any member of the legislative committee hearing and favorably report-
ing the bill amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841 raise the issue presented in Sonnier.
10. See State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
11. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 694 enacting Chapter 3, Sentencing in Capital Cases, of
Title XXX of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
12. 379 So. 2d at 1371.
13. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.9 and Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28.
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ror doctrine. Presumably, the court will review the record and re-
mand whenever fundamental error appears, whether objected to or
not. Jury instructions and closing argument are fertile ground for
plain error. However, the doctrine is encompassing enough to in-
clude any error in the trial of a sentence hearing. For example, a
complaint about the admissibility of evidence could be raised for the
first time on appeal. Further, a logical extension of Sonnier is the
court's authority to notice fundamental error not called to its atten-
tion by the parties. This would imply that the assignment of errors
procedure is likewise no limitation on the court's scope of review.
In capital cases, this approach serves the salutary purpose of im-
posing an independent obligation on trial courts and prosecutors to
see that procedural and evidentiary rules are strictly adhered to in
the sentencing trial.
APPLICATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
During the several years since the sentencing guidelines
statute" was enacted, some trial courts apparently have not been
able to grasp its essential import.15 The obvious purpose of the
statute is twofold: first, to guide the trial court by directing atten-
tion toward the appropriate criteria and second, to require the trial
court to set forth the factual basis for the sentence.
In State v. Jones," the sentencing judge merely recited in
unilluminating fashion the language of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances. He then imposed a fifteen-year sentence for a pistol
robbery of a food store cashier. Finding that Jones's sentence fell
within the "lower range"' 7 of sentences which could have been im-
posed, the supreme court affirmed. The court stated that remand for
failure to comply with the guidelines statute would only be in order
when an "apparently severe"" sentence was imposed.
The court's approach unquestionably links the guidelines to the
appellate review of sentence. If a sentence is lenient and seems to
be waranted based solely on the essential facts of the case, then
guidelines compliance is unnecessary to assist in review for ex-
cessiveness. Trial courts are in effect warned that remands may fol-
low in cases of "apparently severe" sentences unsupported by
14. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1, as enacted by 1977 La. Acts, No. 635.
15. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 372 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1979); State v. Touchet, 372 So.
2d 1184 (La. 1979); State v. Jacobs, 371 So. 2d 727 (La. 1979); State v. Gist, 369 So. 2d
1339 (La. 1979); State v. Jackson, 360 So. 2d 842 (La. 1978).
16. 381 So. 2d 416 (La. 1980).
17. Id. at 418.
18. Id.
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guideline compliance. However, as long as sentences are of a mini-
mal nature when considered in light of the severity of the offense,
review can be effected on the basis of the essential facts of the of-
fense alone. By implication, the court in Jones seems to be saying
that it will not find an abuse of discretion where a fifteen-year
sentence is imposed for any pistol robbery of a convenience store
clerk. In other words, all the court needs to know to determine that
there was no clear abuse is that the defendant committed a robbery
of a convenience store clerk while armed with a pistol. The fifteen-
year sentence is, therefore, justified on those facts alone. A more
"severe" sentence may require more of a factual justification to
assure that the sentence was appropriately tailored to the offender
as well as to the crime.
By using terms like "apparently severe" and "lower range" the
supreme court has telegraphed a clear message to the trial judges.
They must justify severe sentences, but not lenient ones.
The approach is reasonable but overlooks the fact that the
statute ostensibly is designed to encourage judges to impose severe
sentences where appropriate. The state has an interest in imprison-
ment of dangerous offenders. 9 Possibly mandatory minimum senten-
ces and habitual offender statutes 2 adequately protect society
without resort to sentencing guidelines.
Nevertheless, the writer favors a statutory scheme by virtue of
which either party may invoke review by the appellate court for
either an excessive or an unduly lenient sentence. This scheme, al-
though possibly impractical, seems far superior to legislatively im-
posed restrictions on the sentencing discretion of trial judges.
APPELLATE REVIEW-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In State v. Peoples2  the court, without extended discussion, per-
mitted the defendant to raise the question of sufficiency of evidence
for the first time on appeal by assignment of error without filing a
motion in the trial court for judgment of acquittal.
19. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 894.1A states that the trial judge "should impose a
sentence of imprisonment" as opposed to granting probation under certain specified
circumstances.
20. , See, e.g., LA. R.S.14:64 (Supp. 1962 & 1966), which provides for a minimum
five-year sentence.
21. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 893 presently denies to the trial court the authority to
grant probation to second felony offenders except under limited circumstances. LA.
R.S.15:529.1 (Supp. 1956 & 1958) provides for increased mandatory terms of imprison-
ment for habitual felony offenders.
22. 383 So. 2d 1006 (La. 1980).
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This is an eminently reasonable approach. Without a doubt, the
trial court's evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence would be
perspicacious but is not essential to fair review of that issue.
Because reviewing the record for sufficiency does not involve
credibility choices, the trial court's evaluation of the record may be
no more perspicacious than that of the appellate court. The question
is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, was sufficient to convince a reasonable juror of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt." The supreme court can evaluate readily the
legal sufficiency of the state's proof without assistance from the
trial court.
In performing this task the court may order transcription of
whatever additional portions of the record are necessary, even
though the portions are not designated by the parties. 4
The court's approach to raising sufficiency of evidence is
reasonable for several reasons:
(1) the issue is one of constitutional dimensions and may be
raised in collateral proceedings;
(2) the issue relates to the essential accuracy of the fact-finding
process;
(3) the issue is one which does not require the trial court's in-
itial evaluation; and
(4) requiring an objection to be raised in the trial court will not
give the state or the trial judge an opportunity to avoid the er-
ror.
Thus, the supreme court was reasonable in not barring the
defendant from raising an objection to sufficiency of evidence for
the first time on appeal.
APPELLATE REVIEW -REDUCTION OF VERDICT
For a number of years the court has maintained a policy of
reversing and remanding when the evidence does not adequately
support the verdict. In State v. Elzie,25 Justice Tate, as author of an
opinion reversing a conviction for possession of controlled sub-
stances with intent to distribute, noted the double jeopardy problem
posed by a subsequent prosecution for the lesser (and amply proved)
crime of possession. Justice Dennis expressed concern in State v.
23. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); State v. Byrd, 385 So. 2d 248 (La.
1980).
24. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 845.
25. 343 So. 2d 712 (La. 1977).
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Tillman"6 that the system of remanding for a new trial on the amply
proved lesser offense would not enhance judicial efficiency.
However, until State v. Byrd,27 the judicial policy in Louisiana was
to order acquittal of the defendant if the evidence did not adequately
support the verdict. 8
In State v. Byrd, the court finally confronted the problem in an
interesting context: a toy pistol was used to perpetrate a robbery.
The defendant in Byrd produced his toy pistol after a previously
ordered piece of fried chicken was delivered at the counter of a fast
food stand. The young man demanded that the clerk give him all of
the money in the register. The clerk, with an apparently unruffled
attitude, replied that there was no money, and walked away. This
apparently confounded the robber, who took his piece of fried
chicken and left. He was immediately apprehended by two police of-
ficers who observed the entire incident. They, fortunately for the
defendant, seized the toy pistol to hold as evidence.
The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia' test to the Louisiana
cases previously addressing the problem of the use of objects not in-
herently dangerous in the perpetration of a robbery. The court
wisely concluded, under the facts presented, that the evidence did
not adequately support the jury's conclusion that the toy pistol was
used in a manner likely or calculated to cause death or great bodily
harm. As the court noted, the "highly charged" atmosphere, which
concerned the court earlier in State v. Levi"0 when dealing with the
use of an unloaded pistol, simply was not produced.
Although an unloaded pistol is no more capable of immediately
projecting a bullet through its muzzle than a toy pistol, the unloaded
one differs in several respects. First, it can be loaded; second, it can
be used as a bludgeon. Here, however, the court apparently was not
dealing with a heavy metal object capable of inflicting an injurious
wound if used to strike a victim. Also, sound policy reasons, which
were expressed by the court, exist for making a distinction by draw-
ing the line at toys. The dramatically severe penalty for armed rob-
bery obviously was intended to be reserved for cases where there is
a great potential for injury." That was not the case presented by
the facts of Byrd.
26. 356 So. 2d 1376, 1379 n.2 (La. 1978).
27. 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980).
28. See State v. Peoples, 383 So. 2d 1006 (La. 1980); State v. Allien, 366 So. 2d
1308 (La. 1978).
29. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
30. 250 So. 2d 751 (La. 1971).
31. LA. R.S.14:64 (Supp. 1962 & 1966) provides for a time of imprisonment from
five to ninety-nine years without benefit of probation of parole.
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Nevertheless, the offender should not escape unpunished for his
clearly proven attempt to steal money by use of "intimidation." The
court therefore recognized its inherent authority to remand with in-
structions to resentence for the lesser included offense of simple
robbery.
The court's rationale is sound. The jury's verdict was unsup-
ported only insofar as it reflected a finding that the toy pistol was a
dangerous weapon. In all other respects it was amply supported, and
amply supported a verdict of guilty of the lesser included crime of
simple robbery. In employing the Byrd approach the court merely
applies the Jackson test to strike the unsupported, additional ele-
ment. As Justice Lemmon, writing for the majority, said, the pro-
cedure does not "deprive defendant of the right to have a trial judge
or jury decide on proof of the elements of the lesser and included of-
fense, but rather recognizes that the trier of fact has already made
that decision.132
In Byrd the court did not merely substitute its judgment and re-
mand because the evidence should have convinced a reasonable
juror beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender was guilty of a
lesser offense. The court obviously examined what findings were im-
plicit in the verdict returned. Unsupported elements were striken.
A remand for sentencing was appropriate because a finding that all
of the elements of the lesser offense were proven was inherent in
the jury's verdict.
Presumably the court will adhere to the legislatively restricted
responsive verdicts of article 814 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In other words, if a verdict of a lesser included offense is supported
by the evidence, but that offense was precluded from being respon-
sive by legislative action in article 814, the court will not remand for
resentence on that offense. Similarly, if a verdict is legislatively
responsive but requires elements not inherently found in the verdict
returned, the court will never reduce a verdict to order sentencing
for that lesser offense.
Byrd obviously will present some interesting dilemmas for the
court in the future. As pointed out by the dissent, the court's ap-
proach, although followed in many states, is unprecedented in Loui-
siana. Nevertheless, the path taken is the wise one, and the author
is sure that no obstacles encountered in the future will prove insur-
mountable.
32. 385 So. 2d at 252.
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ACT 492 OF 1980- POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
In 1976, an ad hoc committee was appointed by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana to study the problem of habeas corpus in Loui-
siana.3 Trial judges had expressed concern about repetitive applica-
tions, unnecessary hearings, and administrative difficulties surroun-
ding production of prisoners.
Under the then-existing statutes and jurisprudence, if a prisoner
serving a sentence alleged a ground for relief, a hearing was re-
quired.' The trial court was not authorized to defer holding a hear-
ing or ordering that the prisoner be brought to court.
As a result of the ad hoc committee's study, legislation was
adopted to curb repetitive writs" and to authorize the supreme
court to promulgate rules providing for an alternative method of
handling the disposition of writ applications for persons subsequent
to conviction. 6
The supreme court rules (which became effective on January 1,
1977) were modeled on the American Bar Association Standards for
Post Conviction Remedies and the proposed (since modified and
adopted) federal rules governing postconviction applications by state
prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Following the adoption of the supreme court rules, Chief Justice
Dixon requested that the Louisiana Law Institute draft legislation
incorporating the rules into a new title of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure exclusively dealing with post-appellate challenges to convic-
tions. 7 Provisions found in the existing title on habeas corpus deal-
ing with postconviction matters were removed.
Louisiana Act 429 of 1980 incorporated the Chief Justice's sug-
gestions. Act 429 creates a clear delineation between preconviction
challenges to custody (habeas corpus) and postconviction challenges
(postconviction relief).
33. The author and Professor P. Raymond Lamonica of the LSU Law School served
as reporters for the committee.
34. See State ex rel. Cherry v. Cormier, 281 So. 2d 99 (La. 1973).
35. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 382, amending LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 353 to authorize
the district court to dismiss a writ application for inexcusable failure to raise the
grounds asserted in a prior application.
36. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 448, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 359 to authorize
the Supreme Court of Louisiana to adopt rules relative to applications by convicted
persons in custody.
37. The author serves as reporter for the Louisiana Law Institute Advisory Com-
mittee which proposed 1980 La. Acts, No. 429.
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Persons Who May Petition
As under prior law, not all persons convicted and sentenced may
avail themselves of postconviction relief. The procedures are
available only to convicted persons "in custody," who have fully ex-
hausted their right of appeal.38 If a petitioner's appeal is pending or
if a petitioner still has the right to appeal, he cannot avail himself of
postconviction relief.39 This limitation is clearly designed to prevent
the use of postconviction relief as a substitute for the orderly pro-
cess of appeal.
The term "custody" is broadly defined in article 924 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure to include detention or confinement as well as
probation or parole supervison. The definition merely codifies the
jurisprudence, which has included such supervised release situations
within the ambit of habeas corpus relief.'" However, once the
sentence is satisfied, postconviction relief is barred. The conviction
can be challenged only if it is later used to enhance penalty (e.g.,
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:429.1) or to serve as an element
of a crime in a subsequent criminal prosecution (e.g., Louisiana
Revised Statutes 14:95.1).
Venue for Postconviction Relief
Because postconviction petitions challenge the proceedings
leading to conviction, venue was logically retained in the parish
wherein the conviction occurred.' There the court most likely will
find the record of the trial proceedings, the prosecutor, defense
counsel, and other witnesses whose testimony might be relevant to
factual issues.
The repealer clause of Act 429 of 1980 makes specific reference
to a special venue provision for suits challenging the manner of com-
putation of sentence.2 Such suits do not fall within the scope of post-
conviction relief, and venue for such actions lies in the 19th Judicial
District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. The 19th Judicial
District Court has specially-appointed commissioners to handle such
complaints.
Unlike preconviction habeas corpus, petitions for postconviction
relief must be filed in the district court in the parish of proper
38. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 924.
39. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 924.1.
40. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
41. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 925. Former LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 352 contained a
similar provision for postconviction habeas corpus.
42. See LA. R.S.15:571.15 (Supp. 1979).
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venue." City and municipal courts have no authority to consider
such applications, even in connection with convictions arising from
those courts. After appeal is concluded, postconviction complaints
concerning a city or municipal court conviction must be addressed to
the district court for the parish in which the city or municipal court
lies. For example, if a person is convicted and sentenced in city
court based on his guilty plea and later wishes to contest the validity
of the plea, the application is to be filed in district court for the
parish in which the city lies.
The Petition
Following the lead of several other courts, the Louisiana
Supreme Court adopted an approved form for applications for
postconviction relief." Copies of these forms should be available at
the various institutions operated by the Louisiana Department of
Corrections and also should be available in the offices of the clerks
of the district courts. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
926D authorizes the district court to require use of the Uniform Ap-
plication on penalty of dismissal. If a petition is filed which does not
follow the Uniform Application, the district court may provide the
petitioner with a copy of the Uniform Application and require that it
be used.45
The Uniform Application requires the petitioner to supply cer-
tain specific data and is designed to facilitate reviewing applications
to dispose promptly of those which are frivolous or plainly reveal a
lack of merit. One of the purposes of the 1980 legislation and the
form is to assist district courts in the often tedious task of finding
that "needle in a haystack"; that is, in finding which petitions have
substance and arguable merit among the mass of frivolous or other-
wise unmeritorious petitions which are filed.
Although Code of Criminal Procedure article 926 requires use of
the Uniform Application, dismissal for failure to follow the form is
discretionary. The trial court thus may choose to entertain the writ
application which adequately asserts the petitioner's complaints
even though it is not filed in the approved form. However, requiring
use of the Uniform Application assures inclusion of the necessary in-
formation.
The Uniform Application also explicitly warns the petitioner
that he must include all complaints (which are "known or
43. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 926A.
44. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rules, Appendix A.
45. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 926D.
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discoverable by the exercise of due diligence") and that failure to do
so can result in dismissal of any subsequent petitions. This
"repetitive writs" warning follows the language of the statute and is
designed to prevent a protracted series of petitions, all based on dif-
ferent alleged errors.46
The Uniform Application contains a list of commonly alleged er-
rors to assist the applicant in assuring inclusion of all known or
discoverable complaints. The list also should eliminate the conten-
tion that, although aware of the facts, the petitioner was unaware
that those facts constituted a ground for postconviction relief.
The Code of Criminal Procedure (and the Uniform Application)
call for allegations of fact, not conclusory allegations, concerning the
alleged errors. 7 The form requires the petitioner to "tell his story"
and to list witnesses who can support his version. If the petition
does not allege a factual basis for relief, it may be dismissed without
a hearing or even an answer by the district attorney.'
Dismissal without an answer is also appropriate if the petition
does not include the required information. 9 Before dismissal,
however, the court should have the clerk note the deficiencies and
send the petition back to the petitioner so that he can correct
them.50
The District Attorney's Answer
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the district court to
order the district attorney to file an answer whenever "an applica-
tion alleges a claim which, if established, would entitle the peti-
tioner to relief."51
The answer must be filed within a time frame to be set by the
district court, but not to exceed thirty days.52 Actually, the Code of
Criminal Procedure requires the "custodian, through the district at-
torney in the parish in which the defendant was convicted," to file
the answer.53 Although the Code retains the fiction that the custo-
dian is the opposing party, in cases of postconviction challenges, the
prosecutor who sought and secured the challenged conviction is really
the opposing party. Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure articles
46. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4E.
47. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 926B(3).
48. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 928.
49. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 926E & 928.
50. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 926E & 930.4F.
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clearly recognize his role as the attorney for the respondent custo-
dian.
District courts must not confuse ordering the filing of an answer
with ordering the production of the prisioner.14 Ordering an answer
merely requires a response from the prosecution. Whether the case
will proceed further after the answer is filed and the record reviewed
is an entirely separate question. Whether further proceedings are
necessary often can be decided only after the district attorney files
an answer. In some cases the answer and supporting documents may
satisfy the district court that the claims are without foundation and
that summary dismissal is appropriate.5
Summary Disposition Without an Evidentiary Hearing
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 929 envisions the
possibility of disposition based on the application, the answer, and
other supporting documents.
In order to expand the record," the district court may order pro-
duction of the record of the proceedings leading to the conviction.
For example, the colloquy of a guilty plea may adequately resolve
the merits of a challenge to the adequacy of the "Boykin examina-
tion."
Recognizing the need in some cases to go beyond the record of
the proceedings, the Code of Criminal Procedure now empowers the
district court to authorize oral depositions, requests for admissions
of fact, and requests for admission of genuineness of documents."
Such discovery techniques may be used upon a showing of "good
cause" and are to be regulated by the court. The court should be
guided by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in specifying the
conditions under which the discovery techniques are to be used."
Discovery devices may be employed effectively to eliminate
possible factual disputes by fully developing the petitioner's allega-
tions. What appears to be a factually meritorious claim (when alleged
in the petition) may collapse after the petitioner's deposition has
been taken and, under oath, he recants some of his allegations.
After the methods of expanding the record have been employed,
the court may find that no evidentiary hearing is needed."
54. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 927B.
55. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 929A.
56. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 929B.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 929A.
[Vol. 41
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 19 79-1980
Due to the obvious importance of the discovery procedures in
determining the appropriateness of summary dismissal, the peti-
tioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel if such methods are
utilized."6
The availability of summary disposition recognizes the obvious
fact that the record or expanded record will sometimes conclusively
belie the allegations of the petition. An evidentiary hearing will be
necessary only to resolve disputes over contested facts where real
credibility issues are presented."1
Whether the sort of factual dispute exists which requires an
evidentiary hearing is obviously a sensitive question and deserves
the most careful consideration by the trial court. The credibility of
witnesses cannot generally be resolved on a "cold record." The proper
method to dispose of a genuine and material factual dispute is by
evidentiary hearing where witnesses testify before the district court
subject to cross examination. However, that is not to suggest that a
summary disposition is never appropriate just because there are
some factual disputes. For example, if a petitioner alleges that he
was not advised of certain of his rights during his arraignment and
the record shows that such advice was given, summary disposition
may be appropriate despite what might be characterized as a factual
dispute.
The wording of the code article is significant. Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 930 requires an evidentiary hearing if
there are "questions of fact which cannot properly be resolved" on
the basis of the expanded record. Obviously, the Code of Criminal
Procedure assumes that some factual disputes can be resolved on
the record and some cannot. Article 929A specifically refers to the
resolution of "factual and legal" issues on the basis of the expanded
record (including depositions, other "reliable" documents, etc.). This
is a matter which must be approached with much caution. The trial
court must be sensitive to the petitioner's right to have fair deter-
mination of the factual basis of his claim.2
A hearing requiring production of the petitioner will be required
when factual disputes exist which cannot properly be resolved on
the basis of the record or the expanded record. Several aspects of
this evidentiary hearing should be considered.
Evidentiary rules governing the trial on the question of guilt or
60. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.7.
61. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 929 & 930.
62. See Jordon v. Estelle, 594 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979); Scott v. Estelle, 567 F.2d
632 (5th Cir. 1978); Crawford v. Linahan, 253 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. 1979).
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innocence need not be followed at the hearing 6 3 Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 930B specificially recognizes admissibility
of various properly authenticated documents, such as records,
transcripts, depositions and admissions of fact.
Since the search for truth is the district court's paramount con-
cern, all reliable evidence tending to establish the relevant facts
should be considered. With the judge as fact-finder in this hearing,
objections on traditional hearsay grounds generally can be con-
sidered as affecting the weight rather than the admissibility of the
evidence.
If an evidentiary hearing is held, the petitioner is entitled to
counsel, and to court-appointed counsel if indigent."4 Because most
petitioners will be indigent prisioners who have no means to employ
counsel, the court generally must appoint counsel if an evidentiary
hearing is ordered.
Basis for Granting or Denying Relief
Not all issues will be considered on their merits in postconvic-
tion proceedings. First, some purely statutory rights are not deemed
crucial enough to warrant inclusion in the postconviction relief pro-
visions." Second, issues which already have been fully litigated
generally cannot be reasserted.." Third, failure to raise cognizable
issues at an earlier stage of the proceedings often will bar relief."
As is evident, only matters of fundamental significance can be
raised. Most of the grounds for relief have a constitutional basis,
either state or federal.
The "repetitive applications" article recognizes two distinctly
63. See Crawford v. Linahan, 253 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. 1979).
64. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.7. See State ex reL Cherry v. Cormier, 281 So. 2d
99 (1973).
65. LA. CODE CIM. P. art. 930.3 provides:
If the petitioner is in custody after sentence for conviction for an offense,
relief shall be granted only on the following grounds:
(1) The conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution of the United
States or the state of Louisiana;
(2) The court exceeded its jurisdiction;
(3) The conviction or sentence subjected him to double jeopardy;
(4) The limitations on the institution of prosecution had expired;
(5) The statute creating the offense for which he was convicted and sentenced
is unconstitutional; or
(6) The conviction or sentences constitute the ex post facto application of law
in violation of the constitution of the United States or the state of Louisiana.
66. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4A & D.
67. LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 930.4B, C, & E.
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different bases for dismissal without reaching the merits of applica-
tion. The first involves the prior litigation of the issue on appeal or
in a prior application for postconviction relief. 8 The second involves
an "inexcusable" procedural default on the part of petitioner due to
his failure to raise or pursue the claim in earlier proceedings. 9 The
"repetitive applications" article is very broad in scope and is phrased
in discretionary terms. Obviously, the court must assess fairness
considerations to the state and the petitioner in deciding whether to
allow the petitioner to relitigate or raise his claim.
If the claim was previously considered on appeal (or in a prior
application), the court should give the petitioner an opportunity to
show why relitigation is appropriate because (1) the ground may be
considered in the interest of justice, and (2) the ground must have
been litigated fully on appeal. Thus, the court properly may consider
an issue previously disposed of if justice requires relitigation or if
the handling of the appeal was such that the ground was not
litigated fully. The court must consider such factors as the com-
petency of defense counsel and subsequent jurisprudential
developments.
The following situations give rise to a procedural default which
may bar raising the claim in post conviction proceedings:
(1) "If the application alleges a claim of which the petitioner
had knowledge and inexcusably failed to raise in the proceedings
leading to conviction, the court may deny relief."7
(2) "If the application alleges a claim which the petitioner raised
in the trial court and inexcusably failed to pursue on appeal, the
court may deny relief."7
(3) "A successive application may be dismissed if it raises a
new or different claim that was inexcusably omitted from a prior
application. 72
The concept of an inexcusable procedural default obviously will
have to be developed by the jurisprudence. Federal courts have
employed the "cause and prejudice" test of Wainwright v. Sykes.13
68. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4A & D.
69. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4B, C, & E.
70. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4B.
71. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4C.
72. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.4E.
73. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See United States v. Brown, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980); Parton v. Wyrich, 614 F.2d 154 (8th Cir.
1980); Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1979); Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1979); Rachel v. Bordenkircher 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1978); O'Berry v.
Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The two tests should be developed along parallel lines for the ob-
vious reason that to do otherwise would be to invite the necessity of
federal intervention into the state criminal justice process. If Loui-
siana courts will not allow petitioners to raise federal constitutional
claims which can be raised in federal district courts, they will pre-
vent full and fair litigation in state courts, thereby paving the way
to the federal habeas court.' The state courts should, of course, pro-
vide an adequate corrective process and must be cognizant of the
development of the "cause and prejudice" test by federal courts.
Whether a procedural default by the petitioner is "excusable" is
obviously a very sensitive issue which must be decided in an adver-
sary context.75 The district court should never simply dismiss an ap-
plication as "repetitive" on the face of the pleadings without first af-
fording the petitioner an opportunity to show cause for his failure to
raise or pursue the claim in the earlier proceedings."6
Judgment Granting or Denying Relief
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the district court to
render written or transcribed reasons for granting or denying
relief." A copy of the judgment and of the reasons for judgment
must be furnished to the petitioner, the district attorney, and the
custodian."8
The Code of Criminal Procedure uses the term "furnished"
rather than "served" to avoid technical connotations associated with
service of process. It is enough that all concerned are given a copy
by some means.
The district judge's reasons will be very important if the judg-
ment is reviewed by the Louisiana Supreme Court or by a federal
district or appellate court.7" The reasons may be brief but should in-
clude findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Custody of Petitioner
The petitioner is entitled to be released from custody if relief is
granted on a ground which would bar retrial for the offense, e.g., a
successful plea of double jeopardy." However, even in such case the
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976); Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980); Galtieri
v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
75. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 930.4F & 930.7.
76. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 930.4F.
77. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.1.
78. Id.
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
80. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.5.
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district court or supreme court may stay the effect of the judgment
granting relief pending the state's application for review. 1 The grant-
ing of a stay is discretionary with either court.
If relief is granted on a ground which merely would entitle the
petitioner to a new trial, then he is entitled to have bail set pending
the new trial.2 An exception to this general rule exists in capital
cases in which bail may be denied initially.83 An application for bail
may be stayed pending the state's application for review.84 Thus, the
petitioner's right to be admitted to bail may come into effect only
upon the supreme court's denial of the state's application for
review."
Review of District Court Judgments
The petitioner's review of a trial court judgment is by applica-
tion to the supreme court under the supreme court's supervisory
jurisdiction. The state also may apply to the supreme court for
supervisory review from an adverse judgment. 7 The only exception
exists in a case in which the basis for granting relief involves declar-
ing a statute or ordinance to be unconstitutional.8 In that case,
under article V, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution, the supreme
court has appellate jurisdiction and the state may appeal. The ap-
peal provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable.
The district court must set the appropriate return dates in cases of
applications for supervisory writs or appeals.
Right to Counsel
Petitioners are statutorily entitled to counsel if:
(1) an evidentiary hearing is ordered, or
(2) discovery is authorized to expand the record, or
(3) the court is considering dismissal for failure to raise the
issue in an earlier proceeding. 1
If the court determines that the "repetitive writs" provisions
81. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.6.
82. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.5.
83. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.5 & 313.
84. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.6.
85. Id.
86. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.5; LA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 911-23.
90. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 919.
91. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 930.7.
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may be a basis for dismissal, the court must appoint counsel.2
Counsel for the petitioner is critical in assisting him in explaining
his failure to raise the issue in earlier proceedings. Because
dismissal on this basis precludes reaching the merits of the peti-
tioner's contentions, counsel's intervention at this stage is of ex-
treme importance. Similarly, the authorization of the use of
discovery to expand the record may lead the court to dismiss
without an evidentiary hearing. 3 Thus, counsel must be appointed to
protect the interest of the petitioner.
In Louisiana, counsel has always been required if an evidentiary
hearing is held." Counsel's role in developing the facts and in cross-
examining the state's witnesses is obvious.
Otherwise, the appointment of counsel is discretionary, even
though the petition alleges a claim which, if established, would entitle
him to relief. Appointment of counsel is not required on the basis of
the allegations of the petition alone.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See State ex rel. Cherry v. Cormier, 281 So. 2d 99 (La. 1973).
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